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Economic Interdependence and War argues that dependent
great powers may be inclined either toward peace or toward
actions that can lead to war depending on whether their expec-
tations of the future commercial environment are positive or
negative.1 States that are optimistic about their ability to have
access to raw materials, investment, and markets will be in-
clined toward moderate policies that build their long-term eco-
nomic power and that avoid pushing other states into restric-
tive policies that set off destabilizing trade-security spirals
(e.g., China 1985-2015). By contrast, great powers that believe
others are cutting them off from access to trade and invest-
ment will fear a decline in their power and thus be more likely to
initiate military policies that prevent this decline through in-
creased control over economic spheres of influence (e.g., Ja-
pan 1930-41). Bridging the divide between liberalism and real-
ism, the book thus seeks to show under what conditions eco-
nomic interdependence can lead to changes in expectations of
future commerce, and thus either to stable international sys-
tems or to ones that experience cold and hot wars.
The book offers two main ways to test its propositions:
quantitative and qualitative. The first half of chapter two re-
views the “greatest hits” of the large-N quantitative work on
interdependence and war to show that an expectational ap-
proach can explain a number of the anomalies in the current
literature. The main focus of my book, however, is on qualita-
tive historical tests of trade expectations theory vis-à-vis com-
mercial liberalism and economic realism. Large-N quantitative
methodologies are inherently limited when it comes to explor-
ing the role of leader expectations in great power politics. Be-
cause there are no surveys of leaders’ attitudes and percep-
tions across historical time, quantitative researchers are forced
to use indirect measures of expectations—for example, the trend
lines of the past three or four years of trade data that leaders
are presumed to extrapolate out into the future. Such measures
are clearly second-best when there are available documents
that reveal how leaders were actually thinking about the fu-
ture, and how these expectations shaped their behavior.  More-
over, when dealing with rare events, quantitative research is
also constrained in its ability to establish exactly what causal
role particular variables might have played in the mix of factors
that led to individual cases of war or the ending of rivalry
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across time.2
The book thus starts its empirical chapters with a short
overview of the quantitative research to provide a useful “first
cut” test of the possible explanatory value of trade expecta-
tions theory.3 The vast bulk of the study is then devoted to an
extended analysis of the documents and the best secondary
sources for 40 “case periods” from 1789 to 1991. These are
periods that essentially cover the universe of wars and major
crises between great powers during that timeframe as well as
dramatic shifts away from conflict such as the Russian-Ameri-
can détentes of the early 1970s and the late 1980s. Because
this is ultimately a study of rare events—great power wars or
behaviors that dramatically change the probability of such
wars—there is a necessary historical focus on the events them-
selves and the reasoning behind leaders’ decisions to provoke
them.4 Yet, to minimize selecting on the dependent variable,
the years prior to key shifts in behavior are also examined. This
allows us to see to what extent the planning for conflict, the
levels of tension, and the probabilities of war changed as the
core independent variables of the competing theories
changed.5
The methodological approach of the book is underpinned
by three main claims: first, that rare events in great power poli-
tics are rare for a reason; second, that we must go beyond
merely showing that a factor was present to show what causal
role it was playing in the “mix” of forces that led to the rare
event; and finally, that the real purpose of good qualitative
testing is to establish not simply whether a variable “matters,”
but rather how often it matters, in what way, and under what
conditions. None of these claims, I believe, should be terribly
controversial. But when put together in a coherent way, they
offer a potentially distinctive approach to thinking about quali-
tative testing in international relations. For the rest of this
short overview, I will briefly summarize each of these claims.
Great power wars and the crises that raise the risk of war
are rare events in international politics for one main reason:
they are events of complex conjunctural causality, where a set
of factors A, B, and C must come together simultaneously for
the event E to occur. Each of the factors is a necessary condi-
tion in the mix, and yet when they combine, they become suf-
ficient to produce event E. This “individually necessary, jointly
sufficient” (INJS) logic is itself not enough, since for almost all
phenomena in international relations, there will be multiple
pathways to a specific type of event such as war or alliance
formation. This means that other complex bundles of factors—
perhaps A, J, and K, or D, J, K, and L—may also be sufficient
for E to arise.6
The reality of INJS and multiple causality in the onset of
rare event E over time and space means that we cannot simply
identify a theory that poses factor A as important and then test
2 See Copeland 2015, 13, 69f, 73f and discussion below.
3 Copeland 2015, 53-69.
4 Copeland 2015, 75-78, esp. fn. 34.
5 Copeland 2015, 76-77; Büthe 2002.
6 See Bennett and Elman 2006; Copeland 2015, 71-72; Mackie
1980; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Ragin 1987; 2008.
it against competing theories that specify factors B or J as
important. It may be that A was present at time t through t + 10
but event E only occurred at t + 10. If our investigation shows
that the leader of state Y was motivated to initiate E because of
A, but that she held off until necessary conditions B and C
were in place, then the presence of A and not-E from t to t + 9
does not hurt any theory arguing that A is a critical factor in
the cause of E.7 Rather, it is imperative to show by interpreting
the documents that the leader of Y was indeed driven by A to
initiate E and for the reasons the theory hypothesizes, even if
B and C are also important parts of the causal mix that led to E.8
The second claim is that to truly understand why particu-
lar event E came about after certain necessary conditions were
in place we must establish what causal role the factors A, B,
and C played in the arising of E. We need to know more than
simply that factors A, B, and C were associated with E. That is,
we need to know whether they were propelling leaders toward
behaviors that led to E, or whether the factors played more of
a facilitating or reinforcing role, or indeed were constraining
the leader from taking actions that might otherwise have pro-
duced E. These are terms that are often used in academic dis-
course but rarely defined. A propelling factor is one that di-
rectly involves a leader’s ultimate ends and desires or fears—
her “reasons” for action. A facilitating factor is one that is
incidental to a leader’s ends but needs to be in place before the
desired action can be carried out. A constraining factor is
something pulling an individual back from doing what she
might otherwise want to do. Finally, a reinforcing factor is one
that makes the potential effect of a key propelling factor that
much more likely to occur.9
When we are investigating historically the complex
conjunctural causality underpinning rare events, understand-
ing the functional role played by a variable is critical. Indeed,
the very “support” or lack of support of a theory will depend
on this understanding. If, for example, a leader’s domestic un-
popularity is pushing her to initiate war, but a high level of
interdependence is constraining her toward peace in the short
term, then the commercial liberal argument would be upheld.
Conversely, if the trade environment is actually propelling the
leader to choose war to maximize the nation’s security, and the
level of domestic popularity is simply a constraining or facili-
tating factor, then depending on exactly how trade is pushing
the leader, the economic realist or trade expectations argu-
ments have potential explanatory force.10 The case studies in
Economic Interdependence and War thus seek to establish
that combinations of great power interdependence and declin-
ing expectations of the future trade environment were critical
7 Stated differently, because the absence of rare event E—in this
book, for example, not-war or peace—is at any point in time
overdetermined, the presence of A during a time of not-E does not
disprove a connection between A and E, since A is not specified in the
theory as a sufficient condition but only as an important necessary
condition within an INJS bundle.
8 Copeland 2015, 74f; see also Copeland 2000, 29ff.
9 Copeland 2015, 72f.
10 Copeland 2015, 73.
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propelling factors for war, even as the book recognizes that
other factors in the INJS mix, including domestic and bureau-
cratic variables, were often present as facilitating or as rein-
forcing factors for conflict.
The final methodological claim follows naturally from the
first two, namely, that in qualitative research, we should be
examining how often a factor was important, in what ways, and
under what conditions. The specification of the essential uni-
verse of cases within a bounded timeframe helps us to reduce
the selection bias that so often plagues qualitative work. It
forces us to include in our set of cases ones that might not
work well for our pet theory. And by doing so, we can start to
identify the conditions under which the theory is indeed most
likely to work, or to not work. We might see, for example, that a
theory’s causal logic is more likely to be born out in situations
of high levels of industrialization and mutual dependence on
third parties for key natural resources, and less likely to work
when states are simply competing for markets in higher-end
luxury goods. By covering a broad range of cases, it might also
become clear that a theory’s core factor A is propelling leaders
to bring about event E only under conditions M and N, but
when conditions B and C are present, factor A typically oper-
ates more as a facilitating or constraining factor. Finally, we
may find that under certain conditions, factor A from a pet
theory sometimes works in conjunction with factors D and J
from a competing theory for a specific event E, meaning that
both theories answer “part of the puzzle” for why E occurred.
Such fine-grained empirical findings should help spur future
extensions of a theory, including the specification of the con-
ditions under which a theory’s independent variables will likely
be especially salient in a particular INJS mix. They may even
lead to the development of new theories that transcend the
limitations of the original deductive logic. At the very least,
they can encourage an investigation of cases from outside a
study’s specified boundaries that will help to hone the under-
standing of the conditions under which different theories will
truly work across space and time.11
All this means that in qualitative testing we should not be
seeking definitive tests of whether theories stressing factor A
“beat” theories focusing on factors D or J. Rather, knowing
that the events we are studying are rare, and thus are only
likely to arise when particular bundles of factors are present,
we can figure out exactly how often and under what condi-
tions bundles with factor A in them are implicated in the arising
of events across time and space, and what specific causal role
factor A played in the onset of the events. When there are
events E that arise as a result of a combination of A and D, we
can then assess both the relative causal salience of A and D in
the mix, and whether A and D were both propelling factors, or
were doing something else to bring about E. From the perspec-
tive of wanting our theories to be practically valuable for policy
makers, this approach to research can pay big dividends. It
can tell a leader or official when and under what conditions to
worry that factor A, or factor D, might lead a nation into a war
11 See Copeland 2015, 70f and 94ff.
or a destabilizing crisis. And even if, say, the bundle of D, J, K,
and L explains only five percent of the wars over the last two
centuries, this fact is still important: if these factors are begin-
ning to manifest, officials can take steps now to reverse the
process, knowing that otherwise a war or crisis might break
out.
In sum, the methodological set-up of Economic Interde-
pendence and War seeks to offer a balanced approach to the
testing of IR theories, one that reduces (but as the symposium
shows, does not fully eliminate) some of the problems that
have hung over qualitative methodology over the past few
decades. By covering the essential universe of cases for a
specific time frame, and by examining what functional role vari-
ables are playing within an INJS bundle, we can get a better
handle on how often a theory works—or does not work—
across time and space, and why. Moreover, by examining the
cases that a theory cannot explain, we establish a basis for
improving the theory and for specifying clearly the conditions
under which it is likely to be useful. The study of rare events
should always lead us to think in terms of multiple pathways to
event E—different complex bundles of factors that can explain
the various arisings of E at different times.12 We can still be
bold in putting forward variables that we believe drive many,
perhaps even the majority, of rare events for a particular time
period. But, instead of endlessly arguing over the “master ex-
planations” of phenomenon E across world history, our dis-
cussions can focus on the healthier debate about under what
set of conditions particular theories should explain outcomes,
and, for real-world policy makers, whether current conditions
justify the use of one particular theory or another.
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